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Recently, a novel public key encryption technique based on multiple chaotic systems has been proposed [Phys. 
Rew. Lett., 95(9): 098702, 2005]. This scheme employs m-chaotic systems and a set of linear functions for key 
exchange over an insecure channel. The security of the proposed algorithm grows as , where , ( )mNP N P are the 
size of the key and the computational complexity of the linear functions respectively. In this paper, the 
fundamental weakness of the cryptosystem is pointed out and a successful attack is described. Given the public 
keys and the initial vector, one can calculate the secret key based on Parsevala’s theorem. Both theoretical and 
experimental results show that the attacker can access to the secret key without difficulty. The lack of security 
discourages the use of such algorithm for practical applications. 
PACS numbers: 05.45.Vx, 89.70.+c 
Chaotic systems are characterized by ergodicity, sensitive dependence on initial conditions and 
random-like behaviors, properties which seem pretty much the same required by several 
cryptographic primitive characters such as “diffusion” and “confusion”. So far, the constructing of 
secret-key cryptosystems, which are mostly based on both chaotic synchronization and 
chaos-based pseudorandom bit generator, has attracted a great deal of attention, and plenty of 
chaos-based stream ciphers and block ciphers had been presented in the past [2, 3].  
While all the currently used public-key cryptosystems based on number theory work well for 
both encryption and digital signatures, it is of much importance to construct public-key 
cryptosystems by chaotic dynamics and there have been some attempts along this line. In Ref. [4, 
5], a public key cryptosystems and modification, which are based on distributed dynamics 
encryption, had been proposed. In those schemes, a high-dimensional dissipative dynamical 
system is separated into two parts. The binary message is characterize by different attractors, 
which are named as the 0-attractor and the 1-attractor, in the whole system. An authorized receiver 
knows the full dynamics and can simulate the system a priori in order to find the state space 
location of the two different attractors. This receiver is able to decode the message by observing 
the convergence of the system trajectory to the 0-attractor or to the 1-attractor in a reconstructed 
phase space. In Ref. [6], a RSA like public key algorithm based on the semigroup property of the 
Chebyshev map and the Jacobian Elliptic Chebyshev Rational map had been presented, and this 
algorithm had been used to design the key agreement scheme, deniable authentication scheme and 
Hash function [7]. Unfortunately, the later studies show that this scheme is vulnerable to some 
sophisticated attack because the semigroup property provides a lot of public keys from a public 
key with a fixed private key [8, 9], and the modification, designed along the same lines of the 
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scheme, is not secure due to the same attack [10]. Furthermore, a Diffie-Hellman public-key 
cryptosystem named KKK protocol, which combines neural cryptography with chaotic 
synchronization, had be presented [11]. Compared with traditional supervised learning, there is no 
fixed target function in mutual learning scenario because each of the communicating parties acts 
as teacher and student simultaneously. Both of the two parities’ statuses are chaotic which are 
driven by the random input. Although analytical and simulation results show that this scheme is 
vulnerable to genetic attack, geometric attack and probabilistic attack, this scheme is still a new 
and unexplored idea which makes it possible to use new types of cryptographic functions which 
are not based on number theory because the scheme can exchange a finite number of bits and 
generate very long keys by fast calculations [12]. Recently we introduced a scheme to improve the 
security by separating the hidden layer into two functionally independent units. Various security 
analyses demonstrate that the success probability for the most successful attack strategy, majority 
flipping attack, is . Meanwhile, we can obtain one bit of secret key after exchanging about 
three bits of information on average [13]. 
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Recently, a novel public key encryption technique based on multiple chaotic systems, which 
can be seen as the mechanical analog of Diffie-Hellman protocol, has been proposed [1]. This 
scheme uses multiple chaotic systems and a set of linear functions for key exchange over an 
insecure channel. Various security analyses demonstrate that one has to solve the Diffie-Hellman 
problem in order to break the system, and the only viable attack is the brute force attack. The 
security of the proposed algorithm grows as , where , and  refer to the size of the 
key, the computational complexity of the linear functions and the number of linear functions 
respectively. 
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In this paper, we show that such a cryptosystem, although efficient and practical, unfortunately, 
is not secure. We describe an attack that permits to recover the corresponding secret key from the 
public key and the start value based on the Parseval’s theorem. The lack of security discourages 
the use of such cryptosystem for practical applications. 
The public key encryption uses the “m-chaotic systems based pseudorandom number generator” 
[14], and the process is shown in Fig. 1. Let’s take 2=m  as an example. Assume that there are 
two different one-dimensional chaotic maps , , let ,  be initial value, and 
，  denote the two chaotic orbits. Define a pseudorandom bit sequence , 
where  
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Fig.1. (color online). The proposed key exchange protocol using CCS. 
The key exchange algorithm based on “a couple of chaotic systems based pseudo-random 
number generator” (CCS-PRNG) is described below. 
Step 1: Alice and Bob, who wish to exchange the key, publicly agree on a common CCS, two 
linear functions  and , and a start vector . )(1 xf )(2 xf 0x
Step 2: Alice secretly chooses two seeds  and and a large number , and 
uses them as inputs to a CCS-PRNG to generate a random bit sequence  based on Eq. (1).  
is the number of bits in the sequence generated. This sequence is provided as input to Eq. 
(2,3), along with to iterate and give resultant . The number  can be varied to vary the 
security level of the system, as we shall show later. Alice publishes  as her public key. 
1As 2As ],0[ NnA ∈
iAk An
iAk
0x nAx An
nAx
),( 1 iii kxhx −=                                                             (2) 
⎩⎨
⎧
=
==
1)(
0)(
),(
2
1
kifxf
kifxf
kxh                                              (3) 
Step 3: In a similar fashion, Bob secretly chooses two seeds and and a large number 
to generate a bit sequence , to use in conjunction with to generate his public 
key . 
1Bs 2Bs
],0[ NnB ∈ iBk 0x
nBx
Step 4: Alice uses Bob’s public key   as the seed and takes the same sequence, , as 
generated earlier, to perform another iteration to get secret key .  
nBx iAk
An nB nA+x
Step 5: Similarly, Bob uses Alice’s public key as the seed and takes the same bit sequence, , 
as generated by him earlier, to perform another iteration to get secret key . 
iBk
Bn nA nB+x
It should be noted that and  are linear functions, i.e., they satisfy the 
condition , therefore the sequence of operation does not matter. Therefore, the 
resultant iterations of the two sets are equal, i.e.,
)(1 xf )(2 xf
1221 ffff DD =
nB nA nA nB+ +=x x . This value obtained can now be 
suitably mapped to a common key K , which can then be used to communicate over the insecure 
channel. 
The following example illustrates the algorithm. Let the two linear functions be 
, , the initial vector )()(1 xFFTxf = xxf 5.1)(2 = 0 [0.06,0.35,0.81,0.01,0.14]=x . This is 
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randomly chosen by one of the parties (Alice or Bob) and is made public. Let the CCS, used by 
both Alice and Bob, be )1(4)( 11 nnn xxxF −=+ and 2 1( )nF x + =  3.98 (1 )n nx x− . Alice secretly 
picks a number  and uses the seeds . Bob secretly picks a number  
and uses the seeds . The random bit streams generated by the CCS 
are:  and
10=An }34.0,83.0{ 12=Bn
}61.0,47.0{
[1,0,1,0,1,10,1,0,1]Ak = [0,1,0,0,0,1,1,0,0,1,1,1]Bk = . The resulting outputs 
published as the public keys are: [3.80,88.59,6.33,512.58,221.48]nA =x  and  
. The secret key
[8.5,nB =x
199.3,14.2,1153.3,498.3] [5410,315360,729820,9010,nA nB+ =x  
. 126140]
In order to break the system, one has to solve the Diffie-Hellman problem. If the linear 
functions ( )f x  are suitably chosen, one cannot easily guess the constituent operations that 
convert the start vector  to the public keys and , and then can not find 
from and . The only viable attack is the brute force attack, where the adversary has 
to try all the possible combinations of sequences. Let the value and  be chosen in the 
range[0 . Let each of the linear functions 
0x nAx nBx
nA nB+x nAx nBx
nAx nBx
, ]N 1 2( ), ( ), , ( )mf x f x f x"  require on the order of 
 floating point operations to execute. Then, in order to establish the key (by Alice or Bob), it 
requires on the order of floating point operations. However, the adversary has to decide for 
every number in the sequence which of the linear functions to use. Therefore, the complexity to 
break the cryptosystem is on the order of [1].  
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The public-key cryptosystem was presumed to be secure based on the following observation: 
the adversary can not easily guess the constituent operations that convert the start value to the 
public key and . However, as shown in steps 2 and 4 of the algorithm, if the adversary 
calculates the total numbers of “1” and “0” in the bit sequence , he can calculate the secret key 
 based on the equation: , where and  are the total 
numbers of “1” and “0” in .  In the following, we will take the linear functions 
, as example and show that the above cryptosystem is not secure. 
Given the public keys and the start value, the adversary can recover and  after some 
algebra, and then the public key can be calculated correctly. 
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 will be hold for sure. Based on this fact, the attack strategy is described as follows: 
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Step 3: Let’s define two variables and firstly. We enumerate every possible integer 1nI 2nI
2nI in  to find the least value[0, ]N 2 4nI = , which makes 1nI = log 6M C =  a positive integer, 
where . Let 22/(1.5) 15625nIC S= = 1 1A nn I= ， 2 2A nn I= ; 
Step 4: Calculate the secret key nA nB+ =x   with the 
public key according to . 
[5410,315360, 729820,9010,126140]
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In conclusion, several weaknesses in such public key encryption technique are shown. Given 
the public keys and the initial vector, the adversary can recover the secret key correctly. A 
dynamic system with deterministic randomness may be used to improve the security of ergodicity 
based chaotic cryptosystem [16]. In fact a realizable asymptotic model to describe the 
deterministic randomness has been reported [17]. 
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